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NOTES
INSURANCE: APPLICABILITY OF THE MISSOURI
SUICIDE STATUTE TO ACCIDENT POLICIES AND
DOUBLE INDEMNITY PROVISIONS OF LIFE
INSURANCE POLICIES
A Missouri statute1 provides that "in all suits upon policies of in-
surance upon life . . . it shall be no defense that the insured com-
mitted suicide . . . ." The courts have long interpreted this statute as
applying to accident policies and to double indemnity provisions, 2 as
well as to life insurance policies.2 However, this interpretation of the
statute has recently been nullified by a decision of the St. Louis Court
of Appeals4 It is the purpose of this note to examine the statute and
evaluate its effect in the light of the recent decision.
The Missouri suicide statute was first enacted in 1879 to invalidate
stipulations commonly inserted in insurance policies to exclude
coverage in the event the insured commits suicide5 In the 1898 case
1. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 376.620 (1949).
2. Logan v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 146 Mo. 114, 47 S.W. 948 (1898). All subse-
quent cases dealing with the statute's effect upon accident policies have adopted
this interpretation. See, e.g., Kaskowitz v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 316 S.W.2d 132
(Mo. App. 1958); Aufrichtig v. Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 298 Mo. 1, 249
S.W. 913 (1923); Scales v. National Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 212 S.W. 8 (Mo. 1919).
But cf. Ticktin v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 87 Fed. 543 (W.D. Mo. 1898).
A double indemnity provision in a life insurance policy is a form of accident
insurance and is treated as such by the courts; therefore in this note the term
"accident policy" will be used generically to cover both forms.
3. Knights Templars' and Masons' Life Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U.S. 197
(1902). But the statute does not apply to fraternal benefit insurance, Tice v.
Knights of Pythias, 204 Mo. 349, 102 S.W. 1013 (1907) ; nor to stipulated premium
insurance, Baker v. National Home Life Ins. Co., 239 Mo. App. 990, 195 S.W.2d
912 (1946); although it does apply to policies issued on the assessment plan,
Bowers v. Missouri Mut. Ass'n, 333 Mo. 492, 62 S.W.2d 1058 (1933) (dictum);
Andrus v. Business Men's Acc. Ass'n, 283 Mo. 442, 223 S.W. 70 (1920).
4. Kaskowitz v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 316 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. App. 1958).
5. These clauses are necessary because the veight of American authority holds
that death by suicide is not impliedly excepted from the risks an insurer assumes
under a life insurance policy. Vance, Insurance § 94, at 560 (3d ed. 1951). How-
ever, for a time the federal and some state courts held that there was such
implied exclusion on grounds of public policy. Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169
U.S. 139 (1898). The latter position has now been generally repudiated. North-
western Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 254 U.S. 96 (1920). For a general discus-
sion of the problems of suicide coverage see Fallon, Coverage and Suicide in Life
Insurance, 58 Dick. L. Rev. 1 (1953).
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of Logan v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,6 the Missouri Supreme Court was
presented with the sole issue of whether or not the statute was ap-
plicable to accident policies. The court held that an accident policy
was a policy of insurance upon life within the meaning of the statute
and allowed recovery, the statute barring the insurer's defense based
on the stipulation excluding suicide from coverage. It does not appear
from the report of the case whether the insured was sane or insane
at the time of the suicide. Furthermore, because of the insurer's
willingness to limit the issue, the court did not concern itself with the
distinction long recognized by all courts that suicide while sane is
not an accident but that suicide while insane is an accident7 the
reason generally given being that the condition of insanity itself is a
risk undertaken by the insurer.8 Following the Logan decision the
statute was broadly interpreted in the 1910 case of Applegate v.
Travelers Ins. Co.9 There the St. Louis Court of Appeals held that
an accident policy clause, which denied the right of recovery if death
were by poisoning, could not be a defense to the insurer where death
by poisoning was suicidal. The court presaged future developments
by reasoning that such an exclusionary clause would be used by in-
surers to annul the effect of the statute on accident insurance. 1°
It was not until 1919, in the decisions of Brunswick v. Standard
Ace. Ins. Co.:" and Scales v. Nat'l Life & Ace. Ins. Co.,'2 that the
court questioned these early decisions for their failure to differentiate
between suicide while sane and suicide while insane. In both cases
suit on accident policies had been brought to recover when the insured
had committed suicide while sane. In both cases the supreme court
denied recovery on the ground that a suicide while sane was not
within the coverage of the policy because only suicide while insane
is an accident. The statute might invalidate the clause excluding
suicide from coverage where the suicide was committed while insane
but in the case of sane suicide there would be no cause of action at all.
The statute, said the court, merely abolished the insurer's defense of
suicide and did not write into the policy a cause of action where none
existed upon the facts. 3
6. 146 Mo. 114, 47 S.W. 948 (1898).
7. Vance, op. cit. supra note 5, § 95, at 566. The test for determining the
difference between suicide while sane and suicide while insane was established
for Missouri in Rodgers v. Travelers Ins. Co., 311 Mo. 249, 278 S.W. 368 (1925)
and Lemmon v. Continental Cas. Co., 350 Mo. 1107, 169 S.W.2d 920 (1943).
8. Vance, op. cit. supra note 5, § 94, at 563-64.
9. 153 M . App. 63, 132 S.W. 2 (1910).
10. Id. at 87-90, 132 S.W. at 10-11.
11. 278 Mo. 154, 213 S.W. 45 (1919).
12. 212 S.W. 8 (Mo. 1919).
13. 278 Mo. at 169, 213 S.W. at 49; 212 S.W. at 9-10.
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The reasoning of the Scales and Brunswick cases was applied in
1943 to effect a reversal of the Applegate decision. Like the Applegate
case, the case of Fields v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co.'4 was concerned with
suicidal poisoning while insane and a policy clause specifically ex-
cluding liability for death caused by poisoning. In the Applegate case
the court had held that such a clause was ineffective where the poison-
ing was suicidal because otherwise the intent of the statute with
regard to accident policies would be defeated. In the Fields case the
court, employing the rationale of the Scales and Brunswick decisions
that the statute had not enlarged the insurer's obligation under the
policy, concluded that inasmuch as death was by poisoning, and the
policy excluded poisoning from coverage, there could be no recovery
even though the poisoning was suicidal. The statute removed the
insurer's defense where the suicide was committed while insane, but
it did not remove the defense of no liability for poisoning.
In the 1958 decision in Kaskowitz v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.,l5 the rea-
soning of the Fields case was extended to the common exclusionary
clause pertaining to death resulting from mental disease or infirmity.
The insured had committed suicide while insane by jumping to his
death from a sixth floor window. The policy contained no exclusion
pertaining to death from falls, but the court denied recovery on the
basis of another clause excluding from coverage death resulting from
mental disease. The court found that the purpose of the latter ex-
clusionary clause was not merely to evade the statute, but was to
exclude from coverage all accidental deaths caused by mental dis-
ease.1- Since such a clause is inserted in accident policies because of
the increased likelihood of accidental injury to persons of unsound
mind, its purpose is broader than the mere exclusion of an insane
suicide.1"
14. 352 Mo. 141, 176 S.W.2d 281 (1943).
15. 316 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. App. 1958).
16. Id. at 13a
17. An opposite opinion was expressed by the Kansas City Court of Appeals
in Spillman v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 238 Mo. App. 419, 180 S ,W.2d 605
(1944), where the insurer's defense based upon a clause excluding death caused
by mental disease was essentially the same as in the Kaskowitz case. The court
stated that the exclusion of double indemnity recovery "for death resulting from
self-destruction, while sane or insane," followed by another exclusion for death
resulting from "any kind of illness, disease or infirmity" did not bar recovery even
though insured had shot himself while insane, because to give effect to such clauses
would defeat the intent of the suicide statute. But because the court also found
the effect of the separate policy exclusions to be ambiguous, it therefore held that
the law would not look for the cause of death farther than the active, efficient
and procuring cause, i.e., the gunshot wound, for which there was no exclusion
in the policy. On review, State ex rel. Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Bland, 353
Mo. 726, 184 S.W.2d 425 (1945), the Missouri Supreme Court held that the
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Clearly the result of the Fields and Kaskowitz decisions is, in effect,
to nullify completely the applicability of the suicide statute to accident
policies. The Fields case held that a policy exclusion of death by a
certain means was not merely a device for evading the statute and
would bar recovery if the insured fell within its limitation. But this
decision still left the effect of the statute at least partly intact, since
an accident insurer desiring to limit its liability for suicide while
insane would have to exclude so many means of accidental death also
used in committing suicide that the policy would have lost its sal-
ability. In this respect the more reaching effect of the Kaskowitz
decision is obvious j the exclusionary clause there goes not to the
means of death, but to the very condition on which all recovery for
suicide under an accident policy is based, i.e., mental disease and in-
firmity. Thus the result of the Kaskowitz decision is that insurers
have the way open to make the application of the suicide statute to
accident policies a nullity by the simple method of relying on the clause
which excludes from coverage accidental death resulting from mental
disease and infirmity. Such a clause will exclude a suicide while insane
from coverage, and since a suicide while sane is not an accident and
so is not covered, there will be no basis for application of the suicide
statute to an accident policy.
Evaluation of this result necessarily leads back to the question
of whether the original decision in the Logan case, that the suicide
statute applied to accident policies as well as life policies, was correct.
The only evidence remaining of the intent of the 1879 legislature is
the statute itself. Even the court in the Logan case relied only on the
plain meaning of the words in reaching its conclusion. The basis for
the decision was that despite the fact that accident insurance was
issued by a different type of company, and despite any classification of
insurance policies made for purely business reasons, accident insur-
ance was nevertheless insurance upon life."' The reasons for doubting
the correctness of this judgment today are that the Missouri courts
have effectively nullified this doctrine, although still adhering to it
in name, and that no other state having a similar suicide statute
applies it to accident insurance. 9 Furthermore, there appears to be,
Kansas City court was entitled to find the policy ambiguous, and that the decision
really rested on that ground, and not on the ground that the exclusionary clauses
would defeat the suicide statute. The court in the Kaskowitz case pointed out
that the policy provisions there involved contained no such ambiguity, inasmuch
as the exclusionary clause read, "resulting directly or indirectly, wholly or partly,
from bodily or mental infirmity ... even though the proximate or precipitating
cause of death is accidental bodily injury." 316 S.W.2d at 134.
18. 146 Mo. at 122-26; 47 S.W. at 950-51.
19. Vance, op. cit. supra note 5, § 95, at 566. Including Missouri there are
thirteen states which have some sort of suicide statute with regard to insurance.
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contrary to the conclusions of the Logan case, a practical reason for
drawing a distinction on policy grounds between life and accident
insurance for purposes of the statute. This reason lies in the basic
difference between what is contemplated by the parties to a life
insurance contract and what is contemplated in an accident or double
indemnity policy. In the former, the insured seeks indemnification for
an event which surely must happen, and his policy has the character
Of the twelve other than Missouri, ten have statutes similar in nature to the
Missouri statute, but in no state other than Missouri is the statute either judicially
or legislatively applied to accident insurance. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 20-1226
(1956) (life insurance) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 72-3-23 (1953) (life insurance;
specifically does not apply to accident insurance or to parts of life insurance
policies insuring against accidental death); Ill. Rev. Stat. c. 73, § 945 (Supp.
1958) (mutual benefit assessment company) ; La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:170 (1951)
(life insurance; specifically not applicable to provisions of life policy for acci-
dental death benefits); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 688.300 (1957) (fraternal benefit so-
cieties); N.Y. Ins. Law § 155 (life insurance); N.D. Rev. Code § 26-0324 (1943);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, §§ 2722, 4024 (Supp. 1957) (fraternal benefit societies;
life insurance) ; Utah Code Ann. § 31-22-7 (1953) (life insurance; specifically not
applicable to accident policies nor to accident or double indemnity provisions of a
life policy); Va. Code § 38.1-437 (1950) (life insurance). All of these stat-
utes permit the insurer to exclude from risks covered suicide committed within
the first or second policy years, but thereafter they must cover all deaths by
suicide. The Missouri statute goes farther and invalidates a defense based on
suicide whenever the insured kills himself, unless it can be proved the policy was
taken out in contemplation of self-destruction.
The Minnesota and Texas statutes are somewhat different in nature. Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 63.235 (Supp. 1958) provides that suicide of the insured is a proper
defense against any claim for double indemnity for accidental death on a certifi-
cate of an assessment benefit association even after passage of two years when the
certificate would otherwise be incontestable except for non-payment of premium.
Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Insurance Code, art. 3.45 (Vernon 1952) allows an insur-
ance company to issue a policy promising a benefit less than the full benefit in
case of death of the insured by suicide; art. 14.20 allows the same on a mutual
assessment policy; both articles specify that they are not applicable to accident
policies.
In Colorado and Utah the suicide statutes were at one time, like Missouri,
interpreted as applying to accident insurance. Officer v. London Guarantee & Acc.
Co., 74 Colo. 217, 220 Pac. 499 (1923) ; Carter v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 65 Utah
465, 238 Pac. 259 (1925). In both states, however, these decisions have been
reversed by the legislatures amending the suicide statutes to expressly exclude
accident polices and double indemnity provisions from their scope. The Colorado
statute was amended in 1935 and the Utah statute in 1931. See note, legislative
history, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 72-3-23 (1953) and Utah Code Ann. § 31-22-7
(1953). Prior to the amendment the Colorado decisions closely paralleled the later
developments in Missouri. Compare New York Life Ins. Co. v. West, 102 Colo.
591, 82 P.2d 754 (1938), with the Missouri case of Fields v. Pyramid Life Ins. Co.,
352 Mo. 141, 176 S.W.2d 281 (1943); and compare Vann v. Union Cent. Life Ins.
Co., 140 F.2d 611 (10th Cir. 1944), with Kaskowitz v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 316
S.W.2d 132 (Mo. App. 1958).
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of an investment in which only the date of payment is uncertain .2
The insurer, on its part, is aware that it has a certain obligation. On
the other hand, in the case of accident or double indemnity insurance,
the insured seeks indemnification for an event which may never
happen at all,2 ' and his expectation is one of a bonus to be paid in
case he dies by unnatural means. The insurer expects only to be
liable upon the happening of some unexpected and unforeseeable oc-
currence. Conceding that there are policy reasons for protecting the
beneficiary of an insured who commits suicide when covered by life
insurance, where the insurer accepts the liability for the death itself,
these reasons for protecting the beneficiary do not exist in the case
of accident insurance where the insurer has agreed to assume liability
only on the occurrence of an accidental death. In the latter instance
the parties did not contemplate a payment based on the mere fact of
death, but realized that death must result from a more specific, i.e.,
accidental, cause. There is therefore no reason why the insurer should
be prevented from specifying which causes of death are included in
its coverage.
It is the firm holding of the Missouri courts that the suicide statute
was not intended to enlarge the rights of a suicide's beneficiary, nor
give him any preference over the beneficiary of a non-suicide where
both policies exclude from coverage death by certain causative means
or mental condition.2 2 If the statute gives no preference to a suicide's
beneficiary, its only effect is to bar an insurer from excluding from
coverage the fact of suicidal death itself. Since death per se is not
covered by accident insurance, as it is by life insurance, the statute
should only apply to the latter. Seemingly the Missouri courts have
never realized the inherent inconsistency of saying that the statute
does not enlarge recovery but yet applies to accident insurance. The
Kaskowitz decision shows this inconsistency conclusively, and it only
remains for the courts to recognize it by expressly overruling the
Logan case.23
20. Vance, op. cit. supra note 5, § 179, at 943.
21. Ibid.
22. Kaskowitz v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 316 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. App. 1958); Fields v.
Pyramid Life Ins. Co. 352 Mo. 141, 176 S.W.2d 281 (1943); Brunswick v Standard
Acc. Ins. Co., 278 Mo. 154, 213 S.W. 45 (1919); Scales v. National Life & Ace.
Ins. Co. 212 S.W. 8 (Mo. 1919).
23. The effect of overruling the Logan case would also be a refusal to follow
the result of Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U.S. 489 (1907), wherein the
United States Supreme Court held that the statute likewise barred a clause which
did not exclude recovery in the event of suicide but which merely limited recovery
to a fraction of the face value of the policy. If an insurer can limit his liability
altogether, as in the Kaskowitz case, there would appear to be no more reason
for not permitting him to give a fractional benefit in the event of suicide.
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